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contrasted with the disadvantages of both conventional micro credit and the most recent 
neoliberal fashion of so-called ‘new wave financial institutions’. Both precedent and the 
structural logic suggest that this is a promising space for the development of a localized 
financial system based on credit co-operatives, which elsewhere have overcome the 
SME credit famine and stimulated local saving-investment cycles. Recent Russian 
developments are placed in the context of earlier experience in structurally similar 
conditions. These lessons apply to all other former Soviet Union states, as well as other 
countries. 
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   1
1 Overview 
Outside dynamic and often prosperous-looking capital cities, most of the transition 
economies have not yet achieved broad-based and sustainable growth. A misguided 
chain of assumptions—that the small enterprise sector would by itself create successful 
economic growth; that individual private ownership was the only viable form; and that 
local banking services are best provided by large, usually foreign-owned, national 
units—have together wasted much time.1 The major questions of large enterprise–small 
enterprise ecology and small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing, which are 
central to systems-level success, have been left largely unaddresed.  
 
Earlier WIDER research shows that success of a ‘productive’ SME sector requires both 
active financial and non-financial support services at the local level and the survival, or 
revival, or development of a healthy large enterprise sector. This paper focuses on the 
failure to develop institutions capable of supporting economic development with 
localized saving-investment cycles. This leaves a crucial gap, in no way addressed by 
either country-level macro programmes that deal with ‘development finance’, or by 
donor-driven ‘micro credit’ schemes of Grameen and other types operating at a lower 
(local) level. The latter seldom if ever evolve into financial institutions able to sustain 
themselves on the basis of purely local resources, do not operate on a sufficient scale to 
trigger dynamic local-level economic growth, and are ultimately artificial 
manifestations of concessional or charitable aid. 
 
The advantages of credit co-operatives in mobilizing and financing local economic 
development contrast with the disadvantages of both conventional micro credit and the 
most recent neoliberal fashion of so-called ‘new wave financial institutions’. Both 
precedent (discussed below) and the structural logic of their situations suggest that this 
is a promising space for the development of a localized financial system based on credit 
co-operatives which elsewhere have overcome the SME credit famine and stimulated 
local saving-investment cycles. 
2 Transition  without  sustainable propagation mechanisms 
Most of these economies require but do not dispose of coherent local-level 
developmental policies, supported by national-level policy that allows room for 
constructive local initiative and a variety of ownership forms. Local and regional 
governments have a central role in stimulating growth of various types of business 
activity. The ‘local developmental state’ growth model implies a directly para-
entrepreneurial role for local government (even including equity ownership), which is 
likely to be at least in part followed. In most of the transition economies this will require 
                                                 
1 See McIntyre (2003).    2
creation of some kind of local finance system. The natural synergy between 
savings/credit co-operatives and production units with co-operative or partial employee 
ownership is evident in Nordic and other experience. Local government para-
entrepreneurship and credit co-operatives are two among very few cases where 
‘advanced country experience’ is directly relevant in much of the former Soviet Union 
and East Europe, but have still not been applied after 15 years of ‘transition’.  
 
It is important to link the mechanism to finance the foundation and expansion of small 
enterprises, based on localized saving-investment cycles, with measures to support local 
production in the face of the pressure of internationalization of the market. With the 
arrival in developing markets of large, well-financed foreign producers and distributors, 
even potentially promising local production capacities may be destroyed before finding 
their feet. Local producers may expire as a result of short-run ‘predatory’ tactics 
(penetration pricing, loss leaders, bribery of distributors or retailers, etc.) or loss of 
market access. Full-information approaches to labelling and non-tariff preferences for 
locally produced goods are possible local-level policy responses. It is especially 
important to maintain consumer access to locally produced goods when new distribution 
channels emerge. Locally rooted financial capacity is essential if this ‘buffering’ is to 
have sustainable developmental effects. 
 
One particularly promising local government strategy is to combine the credit co-
operative, local social sector and anti-poverty funding, and energy efficiency in a 
virtuous circle. In many parts of the former Soviet Union (FSU), especially outside the 
capital cities, urban populations remain dependent on centralized hot water and space 
heat systems in which there has been little attention to upgrading main thermal 
distribution systems and no systematic attention to improving efficiency at the block 
and building level. Energy efficiency is therefore a sector where local-level financing of 
small-scale local-level investment offers great potential to simultaneously stimulate 
SME growth, reduce energy waste and (by reducing the diversion of local social service 
budgets to pay for higher and rising energy costs) preserve funds for local health, 
education and welfare programmes. This combination is appropriate to most previously 
centrally planned economies and some other parts of the world as well.  
3  Modest results at best for SMEs and local economic development, outside 
capital cities, in transition 
Despite the tendency to think of and present the SME as an alternative to the former 
state-owned enterprise (SOE), except for the face-to-face retail and service delivery 
sector, little can be expected from the SME without either: (a) active support efforts at 
the local level; or (b) the survival or development of a healthy large enterprise sector 
which the SME can utilize as supplier, customer and provider of various social and 
technical externalities. If ways can be found to encourage the formation of purpose-built   3
alliances and sub-contracting relationships, positive and mutually reinforcing 
interactions can be expected to emerge.  
 
Earlier research stresses the importance of developing productive local small enterprise 
systems that go beyond retail and traditional services and the centrality of locally rooted 
financial support mechanisms if there is to be any success in filling the still gaping 
(directly productive) small enterprise ‘black hole’ (McIntyre and Dallago 2003). The 
SME sector needs the large enterprise sector as a source of inputs, a market for its 
output and also (unexpectedly) as source of individual entrepreneurial leadership. This 
points to the need to create a synergistic relationship between the SME and the large 
enterprise sectors, not thinking of a zero-sum environment where success of the small 
can only be secured by destroying or disassembling the large. While the issues of the 
survival of larger entities (where they indeed exist) involve inherently national-level 
considerations, they also require correlate local-level initiatives. 
4  Many examples of the merits of diverse organizational forms, policy 
approaches and financial mechanisms   
There are real SME-stimulation alternatives based on actual developmental experience, 
taking the form of the local developmental state (Johnson 1982). This model has been 
pervasive in successful post-Second World War cases, from Germany, Austria and Italy 
to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and most recently China, but has been conspicuously 
absent from policy advice or practice in the transition economies after 1989. Bateman 
(2000, 2003) points out that virtually everywhere, national-level success in rebuilding 
and modernizing after the Second World War was heavily dependent on SME support 
measures, carried out as part of a national development strategy, but executed by local-
level governments. And often provincial- or city-level banking entities have played an 
important role, either as government-owned entities or as co-operatives with strong 
government support and quasi-public duties. This experience should be well known, but 
is oddly invisible outside their home countries, even when the action bodies themselves 
(Raffeisenbank, various Landesbanken, Rabobank, Okopankki, etc.) are familiar 
participants in international financial markets. 
4.1  TVEs are a new illustration of the local developmental state 
One of the most interesting aspects of dynamic Chinese development after 1978 is the 
emergence of unorthodox ownership and governance approaches that form a distinctive 
‘mixed property’ system. Barriers of culture, development level and political culture 
have made it convenient to not think carefully about the challenging and complex 
micro- and mezzo-level lessons of the Chinese experience, briefly discussed here.  
   4
The township and village enterprise (TVE) part of the system is in active, rapid 
evolution toward unclear future forms.2 The remarkable success of Chinese local 
authorities as facilitators and direct entrepreneurs (para-entrepreneurial activity) 
perfectly illustrates the local developmental state conception (Johnson 1982) and is 
extremely important to other transition economies. The often excessive lending 
enthusiasm (and corruption) of many banks owned by various local government 
authorities should not deflect attention from the extent to which ownership, banking and 
quasi-planning of export-oriented development have been locally orchestrated. 
 
Local authorities in some Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) economies face structural conditions that are similar in 
important ways (they bear effective responsibility for some local production and 
distribution, often have nearly identical ownership/partial ownership/effective 
ownership rights in some local goods- and service-producing entities in the face of the 
collapse of the economic leadership role of the central state and must deal with a 
stagnant local economy). Even in countries where privatization and market reforms 
have gone quite far, some structural carryovers from the planned economy remain. 
Local-level governments in transition economies are likely to remain economic actors 
on a scale generally greater than in long-time market economies, so getting better 
developmental effects from this activity is a vital task.  
 
A key lesson of Chinese experience is that the original core TVE3 should be considered 
as a promising partial or sub-system model4 for other countries. Within this complex 
small town and rural mixed system there are strong elements of municipal socialism in 
which ‘social’ but non-nationalized property ownership plays an important role 
(Weitzman and Xu 1994). In what are essentially closed co-operatives, local 
government may either play only a supervisory and facilitative role or act directly as full 
or partial owner. The classificatory logic used by the World Bank treats all these 
variations as private sector development (no matter who owns it, if it is not the national 
government, the entity is considered ‘private’), making this vital experience statistically 
invisible to most non-specialists.  
 
Chinese institutional reforms and mixtures thus have unexpected local-level relevance 
elsewhere, especially once it is noted how strongly these new structures resemble the 
multi-owner partnership form that is widely successful in advanced market economies. 
                                                 
2 Granick (1990); Sun (1997); Sun et al. (1999); Chi and Chou (2003). 
3 Many existing TVEs changed legal form during the 1990s, becoming joint stock co-operatives or joint 
stock partnerships (Sun et al. 1999). This is sometimes little more than a name change, but large TVEs 
are thereby structurally prepared for the future possibility of becoming autonomous publicly traded 
entities. At the same time there was a sharp movement by purely private entities to take on this same legal 
form. 
4 This is a partial model in the sense of constituting one of the organization types that could be included 
in a system, but not in being a universal model for all components of that system.   5
Stiglitz (1999) and others5 propose wide application of this aspect of the Chinese 
experience in other transition countries. How Chinese ownership will develop in the 
future is an open question, but many small- and medium-sized local SOEs facing or 
experiencing comprehensive reform and loss of national subsidies are likely to end up 
under township and local government control, taking the joint stock co-operative form 
with some degree of employee ownership. When TVEs move from full local 
government ownership to joint-stock co-operative form (with mixed local government 
and employee share ownership) they are indeed and example of what Stiglitz (1999, 
2000) advocates as ‘privatization to stakeholders’. A similar category of employee-
owned enterprises (narodnaya predpreyatiya) was established by 1998 Russian 
legislation and has interesting, but as yet unutilized, potential. It is structurally similar to 
Chinese joint-stock co-operatives and may eventually be able to include local 
government as partial equity owner (McIntyre 2001). 
 
A combination these features could be useful in local-level revitalization efforts 
elsewhere, even though enormous regional differences in incomes and living standards 
and sharply increased inequality within regions pose a great threat to the continued 
success of this mixed model in China itself (Riskin 2001). 
4.2  Finnish co-operatives and development policy  
The Finnish co-operative tradition provides another useful point of reference. For over a 
century, Finland has used co-operatively-owned local-level financial institutions as part 
of a national-level economic development strategy (Kuisma et al. 1999). In 2005 one-
third of all Finnish deposits and loans involve Okopankki, the capstone co-operative 
bank. The Finnish example is a provocative addition to debates about SME financing 
and suggests new tools to support market-based economic growth under sparsely 
settled, peripheral conditions found in much of the FSU and parts of CEE (Skurnik and 
Vihriälä 1999). 
 
Finland has been astute and vigorous in pursuing complex and subtle industrial and 
developmental policies, while simultaneous appearing to the outside world to be 
practicing free-market rectitude. The banking sector is a case in point, where the success 
of the co-operative banking system traces back to tzarist period government (Grand 
Duchy of Finland) deposits (to overcome the initial trust and scale problems) and 
forming local banks into regional alliances under a national confederation, creating 
scale economies and assuring political visibility. Parallel to and with the support of 
co-operative banks, a wide array of production and marketing co-operatives arose. A 
century later they retain a large share (meat 71 per cent; dairy 96 per cent; eggs 60 per 
cent; forest owners 34 per cent; livestock breeding 100 per cent; retail trade 41 per cent; 
banking 34 per cent; insurance 8 per cent) of the contemporary Finnish market (Skurnik 
2002). This type of active use of policy to create institutions is not unique to Nordic 
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countries, but is especially strong there. As the European Observatory for SMEs notes, 
across the EU: 
Many banking/credit/insurance co-operatives and mutuals have their 
roots in the co-operation of SMEs and the objective of providing 
auxiliary services to these enterprises. Co-operation is an important 
strategy for SMEs to strengthen their market position against larger 
competitors. In crafts, retail, trade, transport and some production, 
co-operative members are almost exclusively SMEs. …. [M]any 
[co-operatives] have been founded by and for SMEs and are, on the 
whole, SMEs themselves. (European Commission 1996: 351-2) 
 
In many countries co-operatives operate in legal categories that are not explicitly 
‘co-operative’. This leads the Observatory to note that it is unexpectedly hard to judge 
the scale of operation by productive co-operative SMEs in the EU. Thus it is difficult to 
say how large the co-operative sector ‘should be’ by simple comparisons to other 
countries. It is nonetheless clear that combining co-operative saving and lending 
institutions with production, processing and service co-operatives makes good sense in 
many transition economies. The hundreds of new wave co-operatives formed during the 
severe Finnish recession of the early 1990s are similarly promising. Many are 
technology and technical service companies, in the form of ‘multi-branch work 
co-operatives’ and ‘single-branch expert co-operatives’. The linkage between these new 
co-operative forms and co-operative banking is both logical and straightforward. 
 
National or local government engagement is generally required to start such savings and 
lending institutions, but is criticized as constituting an unproductive subsidy or unfair 
competition to commercial banks. On theoretical and historical–empirical grounds, 
Bateman (2000) has attacked the idea that market interest rates, combined with banking 
conventions about acceptable risk, answer all necessary questions about what is wise 
and developmentally viable in thinking about small enterprise support policies. Studies 
appraising differential SME access to finance within the EU reach the same conclusion: 
The financial structure of an enterprise seems to depend more on the 
financial system and the financial habits of the country in which it 
operates than on any other characteristics of enterprises such as size, 
sector, age and even profitability. Moreover, the smaller the enterprise, 
the greater are the international differences in financial structure. 
(European Commission 2000: 19) 
 
It is useful to consider the implications of these findings for the SME aspect of local 
economic development policy in transition countries, especially in light of the felt 
policy imperatives within the EU:  
The efforts aimed at meeting the Maastricht criteria have substantially 
narrowed the room EU countries’ governments used to have for   7
maneuvers in the field of SME policy. This has not reduced the necessity 
to adopt new stimulating measures especially for SMEs and, in some 
case, has led governments to widen the scope of their enterprise policy. 
(ibid.: 249-50, emphasis supplied) 
 
This suggests that Finnish-style use of national policy to create conditions in which 
local-level saving, financial services, production, marketing, wholesale buying and 
other co-operatives take root, is directly relevant to solution of the puzzling failure of 
productive SMEs to play a significant role during the first decade of transition. The vast 
literature on the ‘efficiency of worker-managed enterprises’ brings former Yugoslavia 
to mind here, perhaps carrying with it doubts about the viability and efficiency of real 
co-operatives. Addressing exactly this concern, Hansmann (1996, 1999) and Stiglitz 
(2000) offer a bracing reinterpretation of the net efficiency advantages of co-operatives 
in light of new developments in agency and information theory dear to the hearts of all 
neo-classical economists.  
4.3  Co-operative core bank plus business consultancy in Spain  
While the Finnish (and other Nordic countries) co-operative approach to local-level 
enterprise finance and production reinforces the local developmental state conception 
and illustrates a highly successful solution to the pervasive SME finance famine, 
relationships like this can be found all over the world. An example is the role of the 
Lankide Aurrezzkia Bank in the famous Mondragón system of locally-owned co-
operatives in Spain, all of which were, and many of which remain SMEs. The core bank 
provides borrowers with technical and management guidance when needed and 
sometimes even moves employees between juridical distinct co-operatives in keiretsu 
style (Shuman 1998). 
4.4  The French-Canadian Mouvement des Caisses Desjardins and the Caisses 
Populaires/Caisses D’Économie 
Another example is Credit Desjardins and the associated Casises Populaires and Caisses 
D’Économie that form the largest element in the financial system of Quebec province, 
Canada. The co-operative development in Quebec was independent and in many ways 
unique, but has some rough similarities to the Finnish path. The Credit Desjardins 
movement began in the late 1890s after the formation of a government commission to 
study the causes of poverty and degradation in Quebec. The commission came to 
unexpectedly specific conclusions about the need to create local-level financing sources 
for decentralized development. This process occurred in the presence of knowledge 
about such developments in continental Europe and the UK, but it developed its own 
self-contained set of rules and structural approaches.  
 
In Quebec the progression from small-scale testing of the ideas to rapid social 
acceptance occurred with extraordinary speed and large developmental effects. Credit   8
co-operative development in the USA proceeded by direct copying of Quebec 
approaches, rules and regulations, led by the Massachusetts legislature in 1908. The 
Boston department store magnate and philanthropist Joseph Filene stimulated this 
development. Filene followed the serendipitous path of first observing British-inspired 
co-operatives in India, drawing immediate conclusion about their appropriateness at 
home, and then finding a fully developed system growing rapidly ‘next door’ with a 
complete set of laws, by-laws and institutional structures, that required little more than 
translation. 
 
The special contemporary interest in the Credit Desjardins approach comes from the 
rapid spread of this same style of organization in Russia, first in the south and now 
elsewhere in Russia under a development assistance programme financed by the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and operated by the 
Développement international Desjardins (DiD) branch of the Credit Desjardins 
organization. This programme emulates, with culturally appropriate amendments, the 
approaches that were successful under structurally similar and extremely unpromising 
circumstances in Quebec and Finland, among others. LegaCoop (Lega Nazionale delle 
Co-operative e Mutue, in Italy), RaboBank (Netherlands), and Raiffeisen Bank 
(Austria), all co-operative banks, are further illustrations of the viability in the financial 
sector of divergent ownership, management and organizational arrangements. 
5  Asymmetric opening: market access and other necessary protections for SMEs 
The major problems of SME development—an inadequate institutional/organizational 
context, lack of product-market access for small-scale producers and most critically 
finance—are made worse by rapid, uncontrolled and asymmetric market opening that 
has occurred in all transition economies except for China, Viet-Nam and Slovenia. A 
recent UNCTAD (2002) study suggests that the process of opening up even well-
established market economies has strong negative effects on the SME sector. The 
results could be even more negative in those (many) transition countries where an era of 
normal growth is yet to occur, magnifying vulnerability to outsiders. This reflects a 
mixture of the effects of initial domestic demand repression and the early arrival of 
more mature foreign competitors in all economic sectors. With the arrival in developing 
markets of large, well-financed foreign producers and distributors, even potentially 
promising local production capacities may be destroyed before finding their feet. Local 
producers may expire as a result of short-run predatory tactics (penetration pricing, loss 
leaders, bribery/black mail of distributors or retailers, etc.) or loss of market access.  
 
A central but often invisible aspect of the survival or growth of productive SMEs is the 
ability to expose their products to the processes of consumer choice. It is especially 
important to maintain consumer access to locally produced goods when new distribution 
channels emerge. Only a short period of exclusion from the market is enough to kill off 
otherwise viable and promising local production capacities. It is important to link 
financing of small enterprises based on localized savings and investment cycles with   9
measures to support local production in the face of the pressure of internationalization 
of the market. ‘Full-information’ approaches to labelling and non-tariff preferences for 
locally produced goods are possible policy responses.  
 
Small-scale credit is obviously central to any successful cumulative SME development, 
but conventional micro credit approaches are not development-functional in the middle 
income, urbanized settings that characterize the bulk of the CIS and CEE. Based largely 
on grant funds and building no viable locally-owned institutions able to grow and 
evolve to a scale adequate to finance serious small enterprise development, they are at 
best viewed as a poverty palliative. Even in agricultural areas their long-term value is 
suspect because micro credit propagators often work to prevent the rise of alternative 
self-supporting credit institutions, such as real credit co-operatives. The enthusiasm with 
which various donors and multi-national institutions view the micro credit approach is 
not justified by their efficacy. Similarly doomed to failure is the recent enthusiasm for 
so-called ‘new wave micro finance institutions’—commercially-oriented, competing, 
independent, financially self-sustaining lending bodies to deliver financial services to 
the poor and disadvantaged. This ‘new wave’ model quickly became a major local-level 
strand of the neoliberal development conception worldwide and 
… has also attracted substantial political support and donor agency 
funding in the context of the reconstruction of southeast Europe in the 
wake of the Yugoslav civil war which ended in late 1995 and, more 
recently, in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict of 1999 … In some 
countries, such as Bosnia, the ‘new wave’ MFI model has effectively 
been the centre-piece of the international donor community’s support for 
local economic development and poverty reduction. (Bateman 2003) 
 
Like earlier misguided efforts to ‘commercialize’ business support services in transition 
economies, these new entities will almost automatically diverge from and ultimately 
abandon pursuit of the positive externalities that are the essence of successful local 
development efforts in all market economy environments: 
It appears that the short-term benefits of this approach are largely wiped 
out by the negative effects of the associated economic policies that 
accompany it, including accelerated de-industrialization, rising trade 
deficits, declining state legitimacy and capacity, and the destruction of 
social capital. (Bateman 2003) 
 
Dynamic economic growth that works for the poor regions and the poor nationally 
requires credit co-operatives and other forms of locally owned banking institutions 
tasked with serving local small enterprise interests. Locally-owned banks and local 
small enterprise systems in various countries function successfully on ‘social capital’ 
that is very costly for large banks that have no inherent local development mission or 
mandate to acquire (Dallago 2003: 78-97). It does not make sense for them to provide   10
the type of patient, step-by-step credit and other financial service support that firms of a 
nascent small enterprise sector require. 
 
Concern over the concrete local development effects is intensified when all or most 
local banks are absorbed by international banking companies. Once under foreign 
ownership local banks are very unlikely to devote significant resources to support 
foundation or growth of SMEs in areas where poverty is concentrated. The indebtedness 
and low profitability of the large banks that did retain their independence strengthened 
their inherited attitude of avoiding risky financing, requiring high collateral and 
charging high interest rates. In whatever form, the consolidation, restructuring, and 
privatization of large banks prevented the establishment and development of financial 
institutions for SMEs in most transition countries. The 2003 WIDER study6 concluded 
that these features of the credit market discouraged expansion and modernization but 
apparently not the foundation of SMEs.  
6  Contingent policy advice or a (discredited) cookbook? 
The point of these examples was to provide the basis for reflection on the following 
questions: why are reform/reorganization approaches so often suggested/imposed on 
transition countries in a ‘cookbook’ fashion. And why do the institutions proposed 
seldom reflect the variety that rules in existing successful market economies, but instead 
focus on institutional variants of distinctly Anglo-American origin (which even for 
those countries reflect an introductory text book simplification rather than the actual 
variety of forms extant there). The same point is to be made regarding fiscal policy 
(USA and one or more large EU states) and monetary policy (USA), where behavioral 
norms ‘at home’ diverge sharply from the restrictionist prescriptions offered to others. 
Exact parallels are also evident in all departments of social welfare policy. 
 
While there is no simple answer as to what the recipients of advice and suggestions 
should do to reduce the damage caused by narrow and unrealistic recommendations. 
One approach could be to simply demand the discussion of alternatives in the certainty 
that there are some. A particularly useful point of reference is the research department 
of the World Bank that regularly produces (in Washington) results that can be used to 
challenge the policy advice delivered (from Washington) through the channel of the 
World Bank country office (Ellerman 2005). As the fashionable management analysis 
of Christensen and Raynor (2003) points out, management (and management reform) 
and policy (and policy reform) are inherently contingent processes, not amenable to 
one-size-fits-all solutions. What will work in a situation depends on careful analysis of 
the micro-, mezzo- and macro-level internally, as well as the external features of the 
concrete situation. This leads us back to conclusions about specific SME policies. 
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7 Conclusions 
A successful SME sector that goes beyond neighbourhood-level services and retail 
distribution (the latter often doomed in any case) requires both active support services at 
the local level and the survival, revival or development of a healthy large enterprise 
sector as supplier of inputs, output market, provider of various social and technical 
externalities, and also (unexpectedly) as source of individual entrepreneurial leadership. 
Systems success is more a question of quality than quantity, particularly concerning the 
interconnection of all the elements that form the economic system. SMEs are a crucial 
element, but policies that target the SME sector without paying attention to these 
surrounding conditions are unlikely to have substantial and long-lasting positive effects. 
Efforts to provide direct assistance to the SME sector often become mired in corruption, 
have high overhead costs and ultimately serve other-than-announced programme 
interests (Bateman 2000). 
 
Local and regional governments have a central role in stimulating growth of various 
types of business activity. This includes creation of a local finance system based on 
credit co-operatives to overcome the SME credit famine and stimulate local saving-
investment cycles, as well as directly para-entrepreneurial functions (including equity 
ownership), all generally consistent with the model of the local developmental state. 
The natural synergy between savings/credit co-operatives and production units with co-
operative or partial employee ownership is evident in Nordic and other experience and 
is especially relevant in transition or post-transition economies. Even in countries where 
privatization and market reforms have gone quite far, some structural carryovers from 
the planned economy remain. Local-level governments in transition economies are 
likely to remain economic actors on a scale generally greater than in long-time market 
economies. Incomplete privatization often leaves local government with some de facto 
ownership rights, raising the possibility of development of something like the (early 
reform period) core-TVEs in China. At the enterprise level, various forms of full and 
partial employee ownership are appropriate, not excluding the local government as a 
possible equity co-owner. Pressures to reorganize units that provide municipal services 
into quasi-corporate ESCOs (Energy Service Companies), TSCOs, and so on, offer 
similar opportunities.  
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